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|Related keyword(s)||altruism, motivation|
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volunteer is included as keyword or extra keyword in 0 datasets, 0 tools and 3 publications.
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|Title||Author(s)||Published in||Language||DateThis property is a special property in this wiki.||Abstract||R||C|
|No praise without effort: Experimental evidence on how rewards affect Wikipedia's contributor community||Restivo M.
Van de Rijt A.
|Information Communication and Society||English||2014||The successful provision of public goods through mass volunteering over the Internet poses a puzzle to classic social science theories of human cooperation. A solution suggested by recent studies proposes that informal rewards (e.g. a thumbs-up, a badge, an editing award, etc.) can motivate participants by raising their status in the community, which acts as a select incentive to continue contributing. Indeed, a recent study of Wikipedia found that receiving a reward had a large positive effect on the subsequent contribution levels of highly-active contributors. While these findings are suggestive, they only pertained to already highly-active contributors. Can informal rewards also serve as a mechanism to increase participation among less-active contributors by initiating a virtuous cycle of work and reward? We conduct a field experiment on the online encyclopedia Wikipedia in which we bestowed rewards to randomly selected editors of varying productivity levels. Analysis of post-treatment activity shows that despite greater room for less-active contributors to increase their productive efforts, rewards yielded increases in work only among already highly-productive editors. On the other hand, rewards were associated with lower retention of less-active contributors. These findings suggest that the incentive structure in peer production is broadly meritocratic, as highly-active contributors accumulate the most rewards. However, this may also contribute to the divide between the stable core of highly-prodigious producers and a peripheral population of less-active contributors with shorter volunteer tenures.||0||0|
|Wikipedia’s Labor Squeeze and its Consequences||Eric Goldman||Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law||English||2009||This essay explains why Wikipedia will not be able to maintain a credible website while simultaneously letting anyone freely edit it. To date, Wikipedia editors have successfully defended against malicious attacks from spammers and vandals, but as editors turn over, Wikipedia will need to recruit replacements. However, Wikipedia will have difficulty with this recruiting task due to its limited incentives for participation. Faced with a potential labor squeeze, Wikipedia will choose to restrict users’ ability to contribute to the site as a way of preserving site credibility. Wikipedia’s specific configuration choices make it an interesting test case to evaluate the tension between free editability and site credibility, and this Essay touches on how this tension affects user-generated content (UGC) generally.||0||2|
|Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-Commons||Andrew George||English||March 2007||For some reason, thousands of volunteers contribute to Wikipedia, with no expectation of remuneration or direct credit, with the constant risk of their work being altered. As a voluntary public good, it seems that Wikipedia ought to face a problem of non-contribution. Yet, this Article argues that like much of the Open Source Movement, Wikipedia overcomes this problem by locking-in a core group of dedicated volunteers who are motivated by a desire to join and gain status within the Wikipedia community. Yet, undesirable contribution is just as significant a risk to Wikipedia as under-contribution. Bad informational inputs, including vandalism and anti-intellectualism, put the project at risk, because Wikipedia requires a degree of credibility to maintain its lock-in effect. At the same time, Wikipedia is so dependent on the work of its core community, that governance strategies to exclude bad inputs must be delicately undertaken. Therefore, this Article argues that to maximize useful participation, Wikipedia must carefully combat harmful inputs while preserving the zeal of its core-community, as failure to do either may result in tragedy.||6||1|