| Feng Zhu|
(Alternative names for this author)
|Co-authors||Shane Greenstein, Xiaoquan (Michael), Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang, Yuan Gu, Zhang|
|Authorship||Publications (4), datasets (0), tools (0)|
|Citations||Total (4), average (1), median (1), max (2), min (0)|
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Feng Zhu is an author.
PublicationsOnly those publications related to wikis are shown here.
|Title||Keyword(s)||Published in||Language||DateThis property is a special property in this wiki.||Abstract||R||C|
|Ideological Segregation among Online Collaborators: Evidence from Wikipedians||English||October 2016||Do online communities segregate into separate conversations when contributing to contestable knowledge involving controversial, subjective, and unverifiable topics? We analyze the contributors of biased and slanted content in Wikipedia articles about U.S. politics, and focus on two research questions: (1) Do contributors display tendencies to contribute to sites with similar or opposing biases and slants? (2) Do contributors learn from experience with extreme or neutral content, and does that experience change the slant and bias of their contributions over time? The findings show enormous heterogeneity in contributors and their contributions, and, importantly, an overall trend towards less segregated conversations. A higher percentage of contributors have a tendency to edit articles with the opposite slant than articles with similar slant. We also observe the slant of contributions becoming more neutral over time, not more extreme, and, remarkably, the largest such declines are found with contributors who interact with articles that have greater biases. We also find some significant differences between Republicans and Democrats.||0||0|
|Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia||Wikipedia; blocking; incentives; public goods||American Economic Review||2011||The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests an inverse relationship between incentives to contribute and group size. We find, however, that after an exogenous reduction of group size at Chinese Wikipedia, the nonblocked contributors decrease their contributions by 42.8\% on average. We attribute the cause to social effects: Contributors receive social benefits that increase with both the amount of their contributions and group size, and the shrinking group size weakens these social benefits. Consistent with our explanation, we find that the more contributors value social benefits, the more they reduce their contributions after the block.group size, incentives to contribute, Internet censorship, public goods, social effects, Wikipedia||0||2|
|Group size and incentives to contribute: A natural experiment at Chinese Wikipedia||English||2010||0||2|
|Intrinsic motivation of open content contributions: The case of wikipedia||Workshop on Information Systems and Economics||English||December 2006||0||0|